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This article examines the rights of foreign nationals in view of Hannah Arendt’s thesis that
human rights amount to little when severed from the rights of members of a concrete
political community. It considers three different theoretical attempts to come to terms with
Arendt’s challenge and to make sense of her reference to a ‘right to have rights’. Drawing
upon these theoretical perspectives, the article analyses the judicial reliance on the
constitutional value of human dignity to mediate the tension between the rights of
foreigners and the sovereign power of a political community to engage in exclusionary
practices. In particular, it explores critically the possibilities and limits of the courts’
dignity-based jurisprudence with reference to the central but unstable distinction between
the dignity of man and the dignity of the citizen.
I ARENDT’S CHALLENGE
In chapter nine of The Origins of Totalitarianism Hannah Arendt famously
noted, against the background of mass migration and statelessness in Europe,
that for refugees and stateless persons, the loss of a political community
willing and able to guarantee their rights had resulted in a state of utter
rightlessness. What was at stake was not simply the loss of particular rights
such as life, liberty or equality but, more fundamentally, the loss of member-
ship in any community. It was at this moment that ‘we became aware of the
existence of a right to have rights’.1 For Arendt, this right was inextricably
bound up with membership in an organised political community. Individu-
als, who no longer belonged to any such community and only could rely on
their abstract and general humanity, soon discovered that ‘[t]he world found
nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human’.2 Deprived of ‘a
place in the world which makes opinions signiﬁcant and actions effective’,3
they were relegated to a sphere of mere existence that was outside the law,
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1 Hannah Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism (1968) 296. See also Frank I
Michelman ‘Parsing ‘‘a right to have rights’’ ’ (1996) 3 Constellations 200 and Alison
Kesby The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law (2012) for
thoughtful analyses of themeaning(s) of the right to have rights.
2 Arendt op cit note 1 at 299.
3 Ibid at 296.
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politics and humanity. According to Arendt, this involves a paradox: the loss
of human rights occurs at the very moment when
‘a person becomes a human being in general — without a profession, without a
citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and
specify himself — and different in general, representing nothing but his own
absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of expression within and
action upon a common world, loses all signiﬁcance’.4
It is at this instant that the inalienable rights proclaimed in international
rights declarations should become applicable. Yet, this is precisely the point
when the impotency of these rights is revealed. Human rights, when
uncoupled from citizens’ rights, have as their subject human beings who have
been excluded from a common world, who can only fall back on their bare
humanity. However, forArendt, ‘a man who is nothing but a man has lost the
very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a
fellow-man’.5 The appeal to human rights as something inalienable and
universal means nothing if it is divested from rights of political membership
and from equality — on her understanding, equality can never be ‘natural’,
but can only arise from human organisation.
As I will argue later, Arendt’s identiﬁcation of the right to have rights with
citizenship is not without problems. However, there is something disturbing
about the extent to which recent experiences in South Africa resonate with
her analysis. The constant uncertainty and fear which characterise the lives of
many migrants in SouthAfrica, arising from their vulnerability to administra-
tive bungling in the department of home affairs, xenophobic attacks, crime,
poverty, prolonged detention and the threat of deportation, appear to give
credence toArendt’s claim that human rights amount to little when detached
from rights of political participation and membership. Assertions that asylum
seekers, stateless persons and undocumented migrants ﬁnd themselves in a
state of exception, in which ofﬁcials have a near-absolute discretion and can
ignore the law with impunity,6 appear plausible in view of the divide
between the progressive nature of South Africa’s Constitution, 1996 and
immigration and refugee legislation, on the one hand and, on the other hand,
the Department of HomeAffairs’ often blatant disregard for binding rules and
precedents relating to the legal position of these categories of non-citizens.7
In the next three parts of this article, I approach this issue from the vantage
point of the debate between three theoretical responses to the challenge
4 Ibid at 302 (emphasis in the original).
5 Ibid at 300.
6 See eg Thomas Blom Hansen & Finn Stepputat (eds) Sovereign Bodies: Citizens,
Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World (2005) for analyses of the position of
migrants in terms of Agamben’s notions of sovereignty, states of exceptions and bare
life.
7 See Roni Amit ‘Winning isn’t everything: Courts, context, and the barriers to
effecting change through public interest litigation’ (2011) 27 SAJHR 8 for an analysis
of the disconnect between a progressive legal framework and bureaucratic incompe-
tence and recalcitrance.
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posed by Arendt. The ﬁrst theory ﬁnds the intellectual resources for the
extension of citizenship in cosmopolitan notions of right, and is interested in
the ways in which universal rights and principles are invoked and reinter-
preted in the course of challenges to the boundaries of the nation state.
Despite the appeal to cosmopolitan law, this understanding of the rights of
foreign nationals is framed in terms of discourse theory, rather than a thick
moral universalism. The second theory focuses on the irreducibly political
nature of the processes through which political communities deﬁne and
reinvent themselves. Here, the nation state’s capacity to respond to chal-
lenges to its self-understanding is conceived in terms of a phenomenology of
legal and political boundaries. The third theory, in turn, is critical of Arendt’s
identiﬁcation of the right to have rights with membership in a political
community and grounds the former in political struggles that are animated by
the very divide between the rights of man and the rights of the citizen.
In the ﬁnal two parts I draw on these theoretical perspectives to analyse a
few prominent judgments dealing with the rights of non-citizens. I am
particularly interested in the courts’ reliance on human dignity to traverse the
tension between human and citizens’ rights and between national sover-
eignty and the rights of non-citizens. Can the value and ideal of human
dignity help to secure the right to have rights, or is it powerless to do so in the
face of the divide between the abstract rights of man and the concrete rights
of citizens?
II BETWEEN COSMOPOLITAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC
SELF-RULE
Recent years have seen a proliferation of theoretical perspectives on law and
politics which, inspired by Kant’s essay on ‘perpetual peace’,8 imagine new
ways of institutionalising cosmopolitan law and membership in a community
of world citizens.9 Seyla Benhabib’s work on citizenship and the rights of
foreign nationals is one such attempt to reinterpret Kant’s vision of the
relationship between cosmopolitan norms, which establish a universal obli-
gation to grant refuge to persons in need, and the prerogative of a republican
polity to determine the conditions under which foreigners are to be admit-
ted.10 Unlike Kant, whose elaboration of the rights of foreigners did not
extend to a right of membership in the political community — for him, the
acquisition of permanent residence was a privilege, not a right, which rested
on the beneﬁcence of a sovereign polity — Benhabib seeks to ground debates
8 Immanuel Kant ‘Toward perpetual peace’ in Mary J Gregor (ed) Immanuel Kant:
Practical Philosophy (1996) 311.
9 See for example Jürgen Habermas The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political
Theory (1998) and Garrett Wallace Brown & David Held (eds) The Cosmopolitan
Reader (2010).
10 Seyla Benhabib The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (2004); Seyla
Benhabib Another Cosmopolitanism (2006); Seyla Benhabib Dignity in Adversity:
Human Rights in Troubled Times (2011).
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about inclusion and exclusion in universal moral principles. These principles
are to be derived from discourse theory. However, Benhabib is quick to
admit that the issue of membership confronts the discourse theorist with a
dilemma:
‘[A] shared feature of all norms of membership, including but not only norms of
citizenship, is that those who are affected by the consequences of these norms
and, in the ﬁrst place, by criteria of exclusion, per definitionem, cannot be party to
their articulation. Membership norms affect those who are not members
precisely by distinguishing insiders from outsiders, citizens from non-citizens.
The dilemma is this: either a discourse theory is simply irrelevant to member-
ship practices in that it cannot articulate any justiﬁable criteria of exclusion, or it
simply accepts existing practices of exclusion as morally neutral historical
contingencies that require no further validation. But this would suggest that a
discourse theory of democracy is itself chimerical insofar as democracy would
seem to require a morally justiﬁable closure which discourse ethics cannot
deliver.’11
How, then, can the idea of an open moral conversation guide deliberations
over ‘morally permissible practices of inclusion and exclusion’,12 given the
fact that those who contest these practices typically do so from a position
outside of the political community and were excluded from the deliberations
that established the boundaries they seek to challenge? How can discourse
ethics, which posits the idea of an open deliberative process where all
participants have an equal opportunity to place matters on the agenda and to
participate, come to terms with this ‘fundamental asymmetry between the
positions inside and outside a polity’?13 Can discourse ethics provide a
justiﬁcation of democratic closure?
In attempting to answer these questions, Benhabib takes her cue from
Habermas’s analysis of the co-originality of universal human rights and
popular sovereignty, as the twin foundations of the democratic constitutional
state. In Habermas’s view, these two concepts are irreducible. Any attempt to
collapse them onto each other rests upon a conﬂation of the moral and ethical
(or moral and political) and must either efface democratic self-government in
the name of universal principles, or deprive us of a vantage point from which
we can criticise the exclusionary citizenship practices of particular legal
communities.14 Accordingly, Benhabib describes her project as ‘one of
mediations, not reductions’.15 She is interested in mediating between the
moral universality of human rights, and the particularity of contingent legal
and political norms and ethical self-understandings. The concept of ‘demo-
cratic iterations’ is central to her efforts to mediate between these principles.
11 Benhabib The Rights of Others ibid at 15 (emphasis in the original omitted).
12 Ibid at 14 (emphasis in the original omitted).
13 Hans Lindahl ‘In between: Immigration, distributive justice, and political
dialogue’ (2009) 4 Contemporary Political Theory 415 at 415.
14 Jürgen Habermas Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy (1996) 94–104.
15 Benhabib The Rights of Others op cit note 10 at 16.
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Benhabib describes democratic iterations as ‘complex processes of public
argument, deliberation, and learning through which universalist right claims
are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked’ within particular
contexts.16 The disjunction between constitutional commitments grounded
in universal moral norms and practices of democratic closure, opens up spaces
for ‘reﬂexive acts of democratic iteration by the people who critically
examines and alters its own practices of exclusion’.17 While these processes
cannot resolve the dilemma described above, they can render the boundary
between the polity’s inside and outside more ﬂuid, and help disrupt the
supposed unity and identity of the people, in the name of emerging notions
of post-national solidarity.
Far from endangering democratic self-government, on this view, cosmo-
politan norms can enhance law’s democratic character. It is through their
re-appropriation of universal human-rights norms, within the context of
local struggles, that a democratic people become the authors of the laws to
which they are subject. Drawing on Robert Cover’s thesis on the multiple
normative meanings generated by legal texts, Benhabib is interested in the
jurisgenerative effects of human-rights norms.18 This refers to the processes,
by means of which the meanings of universal human-rights norms are
transformed through the dynamic interaction between ofﬁcial legal texts and
informal processes of democratic engagement. These processes
‘can structure an extra-legal normative universe by developing new vocabular-
ies for public claim-making; by encouraging new forms of subjectivity to
engage with the public sphere, and by interjecting existing relations of power
with anticipations of justice to come’.19
It is through processes of democratic iteration, grounded in the jurisgen-
erative effects of cosmopolitan legal norms, that popular sovereignty can
break free from its rigid identiﬁcation with the sovereignty of the nation
state. Benhabib argues that in an era of increasing global interdependence and
dwindling state sovereignty, the nation state can no longer successfully host
popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty needs to be reconﬁgured to
embrace democratic agency within and outside the state’s borders. On this
view, popular sovereignty ‘no longer refers to the physical presence of a
people gathered in a delimited territory, but rather to the interlocking in
global, local and national public spheres of the many processes of democratic
16 Ibid at 19.
17 Ibid at 21.
18 Benhabib Dignity in Adversity op cit note 10 at 152 refers both to Cover’s
celebrated essay on jurisgenesis and to the work of Frank I Michelman. See Robert M
Cover ‘The Supreme Court 1982 term — Foreword: Nomos and narrative’ (1983)
97 Harvard LR 4; Frank I Michelman ‘The Supreme Court 1985 term — Foreword:
Traces of self-government’ (1986) 100 Harvard LR 4; Frank I Michelman ‘Law’s
republic’ (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1493.
19 Benhabib Dignity in Adversity op cit note 10 at 125.
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iteration in which peoples learn from one another’.20 The co-ordination of
democratic iterations across state borders (examples include networks of
environmental and women’s movements) enables new forms of subjectivity
to enter the public sphere and can help to establish democratic control over
areas that have effectively been removed from the state’s jurisdiction.
Whilst Benhabib’s reliance on discourse theory to ground her attempted
mediation of cosmopolitan norms and the sovereignty of a bounded political
community strikes a chord with South Africa’s recent experience in making
and interpreting a democratic Constitution,21 critical questions remain over
the capacity of her theory to ground democratic inclusion and exclusion in
universal moral principles. How can discourse theory come to terms with the
historical contingency of the territorial and civic boundaries of particular
polities? Can democratic processes of contestation and claim-making not be
expected to perpetuate — and in some cases deepen — existing forms of
exclusion, given the fact that membership and democratic voice necessarily
reﬂect the contingent result of past struggles and forms of domination? How
can those wishing to contest the boundaries that exclude them from mem-
bership in the polity be ensured a fair hearing? How can those prevented
from entering the state’s territory or regularising their residence be ensured a
voice at all? Does Benhabib’s theory point towards a way out of the utter
rightlessness of millions of asylum-seekers and stateless and displaced persons
described so chillingly by Arendt? Can it be said to place the right to have
rights on a secure footing?
Benhabib concedes the difﬁculties inherent in any attempt to provide a
principled basis for distinguishing morally acceptable forms of democratic
closure from ones that are objectionable. She acknowledges that there is
inevitably something circular and arbitrary about the ways in which demo-
cratic membership is determined and that ‘there has never been a perfect
overlap’ between membership, voice and residence.22 She nevertheless
believes that Arendt’s right to have rights can be placed on a more secure
footing by reconceptualising it in discourse-theoretical terms. Whereas for
Arendt the right to have rights denoted a political right closely related to
membership in a political community, Benhabib understands it to designate
the right to be recognised as a person worthy of moral respect and equal
protection.23 Equal respect for the other, as an autonomous human being
20 Benhabib Dignity in Adversity op cit note 10 at 112.
21 See Heinz Klug Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political
Reconstruction (2000) (analysing SouthAfrica’s recent constitutional history in terms of
a dialectical interaction between a global text of constitutionalism and local demo-
cratic struggles); Henk Botha ‘Learning to live with plurality and dissent: The
Grundgesetz in SouthAfrica’ (2010) 58 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 73 (arguing that
the migration into South African law of certain constitutional ideas and concepts,
derived from foreign law, has been instrumental in balancing conﬂicting constitu-
tional commitments and keeping different constitutional visions alive).
22 Benhabib Dignity in Adversity op cit note 10 at 144.
23 Ibid at 60 and 62.
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capable of communicative freedom, entails the other’s right to demand
justiﬁcation for actions limiting her freedom. This places justiﬁcation at the
heart of the right to have rights.24 Foreign nationals may not have a right of
political membership in their country of residency, but they do have a right
to reasons for limitations of their freedom, including those arising from their
exclusion from the political community.
Naturally, this raises the question how the objections of those excluded
from citizenship — or worse, from entry into or legal residence within a
state’s territory — can nevertheless be made to register in processes of
democratic iteration. For the most part, Benhabib relies on the idea that the
interests of those who are deprived of a voice in national democratic
processes can be represented by others.25 An example is where minorities
within a state mobilise on behalf of those with whom they share a common
origin — the Turkish minority in Germany can, for example, mobilise on
behalf of Turks who are excluded.26Another possibility is that the interests of
non-citizens can be represented by their country of nationality. Benhabib
refers to a case in the United States involvingArizona’s immigration enforce-
ment laws, in which the governments of Mexico and other Latin American
countries became parties to the litigation. She sees this as an encouraging
example of the involvement of transnational actors in processes of democratic
iteration, through which the
‘hiatus between the discursive community of all those whose interests are
affected . . . and the circle of formally recognized democratic citizens, while it
can never be eliminated, can nonetheless be reduced through processes of
ever-wider circles of public representation and participation’.27
There are obvious difﬁculties with this model of interest representation.
First, it is unlikely to provide meaningful protection to those who are stateless
or who ﬂed their countries of origin because they had been persecuted by
those in power. Secondly, it is unclear whether, and to what extent, it allows
24 According to Benhabib (ibid at 64), each individual has the right ‘to accept as
legitimate only those rules of action of whose validity she has been convinced with
reasons’.
25 In Benhabib The Rights of Others op cit note 10 at 13–14, Benhabib touches
brieﬂy on the problems posed to discourse theory by persons, like very young
children and the mentally ill, who are not capable of the kind of speech and action
that tend to be taken for granted by advocates of deliberative democracy. She suggests
that their interests ‘can be effectively represented in discursive contexts through
systems of moral advocacy’ (ibid at 14). It is clear that she has something similar in
mind, within the context of debates dealing with democratic membership. The
discussion of the representation of the interests of those who are not full participants
in moral discourses immediately precedes her introduction of the difﬁculties inherent
in discourses about membership. Moreover, once she has introduced the issue of
political membership, she invokes the language of representation when she writes: ‘I
have a moral obligation to justify my actions with reasons to this individual or to the
representatives of this being.’ (Ibid, emphasis in the original omitted.)
26 Benhabib Dignity in Adversity op cit note 10 at 164.
27 Ibid at 145.
THE RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS 843
the concrete needs, interests and viewpoints of non-citizens — as opposed to
the most generalised concerns emanating from their bare humanity — to
enter the democratic agenda. It could also be asked whether Benhabib’s
model of interest representation underestimates the extent to which non-
citizens’ lack of political power intersects with a complex array of other
factors, including nationalist ideology, xenophobic attitudes, racism, restric-
tions on the rights of non-citizens to study and work, poverty, economic
divisions within and between states, and the tendency of states to reassert
their sovereignty in the sphere of migration through strategies of criminalisa-
tion and militarisation.
In view of this severe vulnerability, coupled with the potent mix of
economic, structural and cultural-ideological barriers to the effective protec-
tion of non-citizens’ rights,28 one must ask whether Benhabib’s discourse-
theoretical model can escape Arendt’s spectre of the utter rightlessness of
those standing outside the circle of political membership. As I have pointed
out above, Benhabib attempts to cut through the tie between political
membership and the right to have rights, by invoking the idea of a moral
conversation through which decisions must be justiﬁed to everyone affected
by them. This conversation is open-ended, in contradistinction to the
(provisional) closure that characterises decisions about political membership.
This is an important distinction, as it seeks to prevent ‘humanity’ from being
collapsed onto a closed circle of citizens. By appealing to the rights of
non-citizens, it grounds the possibility of reﬂexive acts through which a
political community can reconsider its own boundaries and practices of
exclusion. Yet, in relying on this distinction, it must be asked whether
Benhabib does not place foreign nationals too squarely within the camp of a
‘humanity’ whose interests can be represented by others, but, for the time
being, are more or less incapable of political agency. Is she not too quick to
accept Arendt’s identiﬁcation of political action with membership in a
political community? Does she not fall back too readily on the distinction
between the abstract dignity of man, with its connotations of a passive status,
and the dignity of the citizen, as an active participant in the public sphere?
Does she not underestimate the capacity of non-citizens to politicise current
practices of exclusion and inclusion? Finally, is this not the result, despite
her emphasis on the importance of (global) civil society, of a conception
of democracy which still centres, for the most part, on statist modes of
representation?29
28 See Nancy Fraser Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World
(2009) for an attempt to think through the problem of mapping our responses to a
variety of injustices — arising from misrecognition, maldistribution and misrepresen-
tation—on the global, national and local scales.
29 See Bonnie Honig ‘Another cosmopolitanism? Law and politics in the new
Europe’ in Benhabib Another Cosmopolitanism op cit note 10 at 102 for a critique of
the statism in Benhabib’s thought.
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The converse is also true. Benhabib’s model not only underestimates the
political agency of non-citizens, but also tends to overestimate the impact of
formal processes of law-making. For instance, Bonnie Honig points out that
Benhabib’s optimism about the European Union (‘EU’) arises in part from
her emphasis on formal law. It is precisely because she focuses on the legal
processes through which sovereignty has been realigned, borders have been
rendered porous and rights have been extended to nationals of other EU
states that she is able to present the formation of the EU as an instantiation of
cosmopolitan law. This focus allows her to gloss over other features of the
new Europe — eg extraterritorial migration control,30 the fortiﬁcation of
internal borders,31 the criminalisation of darker-skinned migrants32 and the
increasingly draconian police-state apparatuses — and to treat these as
temporary obstacles on the road to a more rational future, based on universal
human rights.33
The disconnect between formal law-making processes and the lived reality
of non-citizens is also apparent in the South African context, where a
progressive legislative framework and numerous court judgments upholding
the rights of non-citizens exist side by side with a xenophobic public and a
state administration which tends to disregard binding legal rules and prece-
dents in the area of immigration and refugee law. This has increased the
vulnerability of asylum seekers and other foreign nationals to arrest, deten-
tion and deportation, and effectively means that the same legal battles have to
be fought over and over again.34 The universalist premises of the Constitu-
tion, which recognises the dignity of all human beings and requires the
30 This happens when foreign nationals, including asylum seekers, are prevented
from presenting themselves at the country’s borders. See Kesby op cit note 1 at 32–6.
Examples from case law include the case where British immigration ofﬁcers were
permitted, through a bilateral agreement with the Czech Republic, to refuse
passengers leave to travel to the United Kingdom from Prague Airport, or where
migrants travelling by boat were intercepted outside of the territorial waters of their
country of destination and returned to where they had come from. These practices
were dealt a signiﬁcant blow by the recent judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights in Hirsi Jamaa & others v Italy App No 27765/09 (2012). In this case,
the court held that the Italian authorities acted in contravention of the European
Convention on Human Rights when they returned foreign nationals, who had been
intercepted on the high seas in what was claimed was a rescue operation, to Libya,
without consideration of their individual circumstances. The judgment is clear that
extraterritorial strategies of border control are not to be allowed to circumvent the
guarantees of the Convention.
31 For example by labelling parts of the population as ‘illegal’ and by policing the
divide between citizens and non-citizens through identity checks, differentiated
access to social security, and other mechanisms. See Kesby op cit note 1 at 101–4.
32 See Etienne Balibar We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizen-
ship (2004) 43–5, 120–4 for an analysis of the ways in which the institution of
European citizenship has coincidedwith the development of a ‘European apartheid’.
33 Honig op cit note 29 at 108–9.
34 SeeAmit op cit note 7.
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justiﬁcation of all exercises of public power,35 are thus undercut by a potent
mix of factors — cultural, structural and political — which tends to exclude
certain categories of non-citizens from the moral community afﬁrmed by the
Constitution and, in effect, places them outside the protective sphere of the
law. These non-citizens are balanced precariously on the periphery of the
legal order and lacking political representation, are removed from the
ordinary mechanisms of democratic accountability. As a result, laws and
decisions vindicating their rights are treated with far less reverence than is to
be expected in a legal order premised on constitutional supremacy and the
rule of law.
The gap between the law on the books and the lived reality of asylum-
seekers, stateless persons and other vulnerable categories of non-citizens
raises questions over the optimism of Benhabib’s account which sees, in
developments such as the adoption of international instruments for the
protection of refugees and the creation of the International Criminal Court,
major advances in the march towards the realisation of Kant’s vision of
cosmopolitan law and Arendt’s articulation of a right to have rights.36 The
importance of these developments aside, it must nevertheless be asked
whether this account is not one-sided. As Honig points out, Benhabib places
us in a ‘temporal register’ in which remaining limits to an unfolding universal
hospitality are ‘always already about to be overcome’.37 Presenting the
history of the rights of foreigners in evolutionary terms, she is able to treat
hostility to migrants as an expression of the particularity and historical
contingency of a given polity which, through a series of democratic itera-
tions, can and should be brought in closer conformity with the conditions of
universal hospitality. She is thus able to present hostility towards the foreign
other as something which always arises from the particularity of a given
identity, culture or polity. This, warns Honig, is problematic — it overlooks
the mutual implication of hospitality and hostility, captured in Derrida’s term
‘hostipitality’ — and imposes a vision of universalism ‘that seeks to subsume
the new or the foreign under categories whose fundamental character and
validity are unchanged or unaffected by this encounter between newcomer
and established rules or norms’.38
35 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA in re the Ex Parte Application of
the President of the RSA 2000 (2) SA674 (CC) para 85.
36 See Benhabib The Rights of Others op cit note 10 at 67–9.
37 Honig op cit note 29 at 114.
38 Ibid at 110–11. In her latest book, Benhabib seems more guarded in her
optimism about the capacity of democratic iterations to overcome local resistances to
cosmopolitan norms. Following Robert Cover, she recognises that the interplay
between formal law-making and informal processes of democratic will-formation can
also become jurispathic, in that ‘sources of meaning-generation may dry up and the
law may stiﬂe rather than stimulate contentious dialogue and the circulation of
meaning’ (Benhabib Dignity in Adversity op cit note 10 at 152). However, she stops
short of embracing Cover’s point that legal institutions are necessarily jurispathic and
instead emphasises the creative role of formal institutions in the generation of legal
meaning. Unlike Cover, who sees a ‘radical dichotomy between the social organiza-
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While Benhabib’s discourse-theoretical model contains important insights
into the contestability of legal and political boundaries, her focus on formal
law-making processes and statist modes of representation results in an
underemphasis of the political agency of those standing outside the circle of
citizens and the profoundly political nature of acts that transgress the
boundaries between a legal order’s inside and outside. Moreover, the tempo-
ral register of her work precludes a realistic assessment of the limits of human
rights-based democratic iterations.
III THE INERADICABILITY OF BOUNDARIES
Hans Lindahl’s work on legal boundaries and political space provides impor-
tant insights into the contestability of the demarcation of a political commu-
nity’s inside and outside. Lindahl agrees with Benhabib that political
boundaries are constitutive of democratic self-rule. He also shares her interest
in the paradox of democratic legitimacy and in asking how non-members,
who were excluded from membership by the constitutive acts through
which a polity established its boundaries, can nevertheless challenge those
boundaries. Nevertheless, Lindahl is critical of Benhabib’s reliance on dialog-
ical universalism to mediate between universal moral principles and the
particularity of political boundaries. He notes that her attempt to ground
Arendt’s right to have rights in moral discourses of justiﬁcation ignores the
incongruity between her two different usages of the term ‘rights’. Seeking to
derive the legal rights that emanate from a person’s membership in a
particular political community from the moral right of every person to be
recognised as belonging to some human group, she fails to recognise that
what is at stake here are two fundamentally different forms of reciprocity,
namely the ‘reciprocity among individual human beings’ and the ‘reciprocity
between political equals’.39 Lindahl insists that these two forms of reciprocity
are discontinuous: the moral rights of every member of the human family do
not and cannot give rise to a right to be admitted to membership in a
particular political community. Unless we collapse the distinction between
morality and politics — something, neither Benhabib nor Lindahl is prepared
to do — a moral dialogue between members and non-members must remain
strongly asymmetrical, as members can invoke their right to determine,
among themselves, the terms of inclusion in the polity.
tion of law as power and the organization of law as meaning’ (Cover op cit note 18 at
18) and who is therefore alive to the interpretive violence through which legal
meaning is destroyed and difference is assimilated to sameness, Benhabib views as
jurispathic only those democratic iterations which inhibit further dialogue through
their refusal to engage sufﬁciently with cosmopolitan norms. For her, jurispathy is not
constitutive of legal decision-making, but simply marks its failings in particular cases.
Her theory is consequently far less alive to the reductive nature of legal decision-
making and views obstructions to political dialogue as temporary impediments to be
overcome through future democratic iterations.
39 Lindahl op cit note 13 at 421.
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Lindahl challenges the view that it is only through recourse to the
universality of human rights that we can hope to transcend the particularity
of civic and territorial boundaries. He insists that spatial and civic boundaries
are not simply manifestations of political particularity, but also of generality.
Their particularity is revealed through their exclusionary effect — bound-
aries, while including some in the polity, exclude others. At the same time,
however, legal boundaries, by closing a polity off from what it excludes, also
include the polity and its outside within a more encompassing whole.
Lindahl uses the example of the EU. On the one hand, its founding
documents articulate the common interests of the EU, which are closely tied
to the idea of a common market and express a preference for an internal
market over an external one and for EU citizens over non-EU citizens. On
the other hand, these documents refer beyond the territorial enclosure of the
European polity to the unity of a global market. Lindahl argues that it is only
with reference to this larger legal space that Europe’s boundaries, and its
normative claim on outsiders to recognise and abide by them, make sense. It
is because these boundaries point beyond the enclosed ‘we’ of a particular
political community to the extended ‘we’ of a more encompassing common
interest and/or distribution of membership and to a place where non-
members are able to contest them, through actions that evoke alternative
understandings of that common interest and alternative ways of carving up
political space. Such challenges
‘evoke an outside in the strong sense of places that have no place in the unity of
places made available by the current institutionalization of the common
interest, European and global, and yet which, on the EU’s own terms, ought in
some way to be a part of that unity of places’.40
Yet, at the same time, in including itself within a larger distribution of
‘ought-places’, the polity excludes certain alternative visions of the division
of global space and of the extended ‘we’ to which its boundaries point. The
dialogue arising from the political contestation of boundaries is therefore
‘irreducibly asymmetrical’. Lindahl notes that this is true in a double sense.
First, assessments of the legality or illegality of boundary crossings by
non-members are always already framed by a particular set of expectations
about the meaning of such crossings. The claims of immigrants are invariably
ﬁltered through the expectations of those who have little reason to question
ofﬁcial understandings of that larger common interest. However, a second
asymmetry may nevertheless enable (some) immigrants’ claims to register
with the polity. This asymmetry comprises the imperfect ﬁt between actual
boundary crossings and the legal order’s anticipations of their meaning. In the
words of Lindahl,
40 Ibid at 427.
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‘boundary crossings can enter from an outside . . . that has no place within the
distribution of places made available by a polity, . . . and invoke a ‘‘we’’ that
bursts the extended ‘‘we’’ anticipated by the receiving polity’.41
For Lindahl then, it is the irreducibly political nature of legal boundaries
that enables members and non-members to contest the ways in which legal
norms carve up political space. He uses the term ‘a-legality’ to denote
boundary crossings that call current distributions of ought-places into ques-
tion. Examples of a-legal boundary crossings include the occupation of the
Brent Spar oil storage and tanker loading buoy by Green Peace activists42 and
boundary crossings into Europe by ‘economic immigrants’ﬂeeing conditions
of desperate poverty in their own countries.43 These crossings reveal the
contingent nature of legal boundaries. On the one hand, they highlight the
correlation between the unity of legal space and the unity of a collective self
— when a legal ofﬁcial declares a boundary crossing illegal, she invokes the
unity of a ‘we’, in whose name trespassing will not be tolerated. On the other
hand, a-legal boundary crossings put both the unity of legal space and the
unity of a collective self into question. By challenging the current distribu-
tion of ought-places — ie by showing that a legal order excludes certain
forms of behaviour which, on its own terms, it ought to accommodate —
these crossings reveal the fragmentation of the collective self to which the
legal boundaries in question are attributed.44 They reveal that the unity of the
collective self is always a ‘represented unity’45 that is retroactively attributed
to a ‘we’. Clearly, this collective identity is fundamentally unstable and open
to contestation. Accordingly, the legal boundaries proclaimed in its name are
also questionable.
Lindahl’s work thus enables us to make sense of the contestability of legal
boundaries — including those civic and territorial boundaries that separate
citizens from non-citizens and a polity’s inside from its outside — without
having to appeal to universal moral principles. For Lindahl, such contestation
is political to the core — it evokes alternative visions of legal space, which
interrupt the supposed unity of the collective subject in whose name spatial
and civic boundaries are invoked, and challenges authorities to defend
boundaries with reference to a more encompassing vision that points beyond
the particular polity. However, he insists that a legal order’s responsiveness
to its outside is necessarily ﬁnite and is critical of the assumption underlying
41 Ibid at 431.
42 Hans Lindahl ‘A-legality: Postnationalism and the question of legal boundaries’
(2010) 73 MLR 30 at 38 claims that these acts ‘contest the distribution of legal places
that deﬁne Shell as a spatial unity’ and ‘evoke a way of emplacing Shell’s activities in a
global distribution of places that is — literally — outside the interests furthered by the
way in which Shell’s activities distribute and use places’.
43 Lindahl op cit note 13 at 427 argues that these crossings ‘can be understood as
challenging how the EU’s economic and commercial policy seeks to realize the
(global) ‘‘common interest’’ referred to inArticle 131 of the ECTreaty’.
44 Lindahl op cit note 42 at 41–2.
45 Ibid at 45.
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the work of Habermas and Benhabib that legal orders, even though they are
necessarily bounded, can nevertheless ‘become ever more inclusive by
progressively integrating what they had previously excluded’.46 Rejecting
the imagery of ‘ever expanding concentric circles’, in which exclusions of the
other are increasingly overcome in the name of universal hospitality, Lindahl
prefers a different metaphor of ‘variable intertwinements’.47 This metaphor
does not suggest that different legal orders share a common core which marks
a universal standard for the progressive integration of those at the margins of
society. Instead, it highlights the multifarious ways in which legal orders
separate and join us together. Given that boundaries are constitutive of legal
orders and include by excluding and exclude by including, some possibilities
necessarily will appear alien or strange. This outside or remainder is ineradi-
cable and never simply ‘about to be overcome’ in the name of an encompass-
ing unity. On the contrary, the unity of a legal order presupposes closure and
can never fully accommodate political plurality.
Lindahl’s theory of legal boundaries thus accounts both for the contestabil-
ity of practices of inclusion and exclusion, and for the limits of a legal order’s
capacity to respond to such challenges. Its emphasis on the asymmetry
between actual boundary crossings and the legal order’s anticipation of their
meaning, underscores the political agency of non-citizens, yet recognises that
not all the possibilities evoked by a-legal boundary crossings will register
within the legal order. The responsiveness of a legal order to its outside — in
the double sense of non-members of the political community and alternative
articulations of the distribution of places with a more encompassing common
interest — inevitably is limited.
It could be objected that Lindahl’s theory of legal boundaries underesti-
mates the capacity of universal human rights to galvanise resistance to the
exclusion of the other. After all, international human-rights norms are
incorporated into positive law — whether at the national, supra-national or
infra-national levels — through a variety of mechanisms, including their
constitutionalisation. In South Africa, court judgments vindicating the rights
of non-citizens rely heavily on the language of universal human rights and, in
particular, the inherent dignity and worth of every human being. Is it not
precisely the gap between the universality of human rights and the constant
fear and uncertainty characterising the lives of many foreigners that animates
struggles for the recognition of foreigners’ rights? Does the incorporation of
human rights into positive law not help to ensure the responsiveness of legal
orders to the claims of non-citizens? Does Lindahl not overstate the incon-
gruity between positive law and human rights, and thus overlooks the latter’s
emancipatory potential?
It is true that Lindahl says surprisingly little about the role of fundamental
rights guarantees in the contestation of civic and spatial boundaries. Never-
theless, this does not mean that he is opposed to the constitutionalisation of
46 Ibid at 48.
47 Ibid at 49.
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human rights or is agnostic about the capacity of rights discourse to challenge
exclusion or injustice. Ultimately, his rejection of universal human rights as a
basis for deliberation over questions of political membership derives from his
fear that attempts to ground a bounded legal order — whether at the
national, regional or global level — in universal human rights, risks relegating
the legal order’s outside (ie that which appears alien or strange) to what is
considered to be beyond the pale of a common humanity. The conﬂation of
moral and political reciprocity inherent in such attempts would effectively
brand those possibilities that a polity does not recognise as its own, as
inhuman.48 Bearing this in mind, it seems unlikely that Lindahl would object
to reliance by activists, litigants and judges on the constitutional right and
value of human dignity to challenge current conﬁgurations of legal space
and/or distributions of civil, political and/or socio-economic rights. How-
ever, this is subject to an important proviso. He would have to insist that
human dignity, when invoked as a fundamental right or constitutional value,
undergoes a signiﬁcant transformation. Dignity, by virtue of its inscription
within a bounded legal order, becomes qualiﬁed by civic and territorial
boundaries.49 Any guarantee of human dignity contained in a national
constitution of necessity must be qualiﬁed by distinctions between citizens
and non-citizens, by spatial boundaries which conﬁne a constitution’s appli-
cation to a bounded territory50 and by the need to balance fundamental rights
against each other and against the public interest. Dignity, as a marker of the
absolute worth inherent in every human being, becomes imbued with a
series of distinctions: between universal human rights and citizens’ rights,
between violations occurring within and outside a state’s jurisdiction, and
between an inviolable core of human dignity and peripheral areas that are
often outweighed by countervailing interests.51
I would venture even to suggest that we can use Lindahl’s work to
re-interpret the constitutional guarantee of human dignity and to rethink its
possibilities and limits in challenging spatial and civic boundaries. To the
48 Ibid at 52–3.
49 As Lindahl (ibid at 52) states in his critique of Habermas’s proposals for a global
legal order premised on human rights: ‘On the one hand, because their referent is the
humanity of individual human beings, human rights betoken an order that is valid at
all times, in all places, and for all individuals, an all-inclusive legal order. On the other
hand, the moment human rights are posited as fundamental legal rights, they are
inevitably linked to a bounded common interest. To posit and articulate human rights
in a legal order is to determine the concept of humanity for legal purposes, to limit
that which is germane from a politico-legal perspective as constituting our ‘‘common
humanity’’. And this entails a preferential differentiation concerning relevant and
irrelevant interests, with a view to ﬁxing what deﬁnes us, the members of a global
polity, as human beings.’
50 See Hasso Hofmann ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ 1993 Archiv des öffen-
tlichen Rechts 353. See also Kaunda v The President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 (4)
SA235 (CC) paras 36–7.
51 See Henk Botha ‘Human dignity in comparative perspective’ (2009) 20 Stellen-
bosch LR 171 for an analysis of the ensuing tensions and contradictions.
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extent that dignity is incorporated into a positive legal order as a constitu-
tional right, norm and value, it is qualiﬁed by the kinds of spatial and civic
boundaries referred to above. At the same time, however, dignity points
beyond the self-closure of a bounded political community and evokes a
commitment to a world in which every human being is guaranteed the
minimum conditions of personhood. This enables a-legal boundary crossings
— eg by social activists, disaffected communities or economic ‘refugees’ —
to challenge the legal status quo in the name of alternative distributions of
ought-places, which the legal order, in terms of its commitment to universal
human dignity, ought to but does not accommodate. These boundary
crossings do not and cannot overcome the asymmetry between the polity’s
inside and outside through an appeal to the reciprocity that marks moral
discourses of justiﬁcation. But they can interrupt the unity of legal space —
and thus, also of the collective self — by highlighting the hiatus between the
commitment to a global distribution of ought-places that respects every
person’s inherent dignity and representations of the people’s unity which fall
short of that ideal. So conceived, dignity can never be fully accommodated
within the conﬁnes of a positive legal order. Dignity always has a remainder,
which pushes against current conﬁgurations of legal space and distributions of
civil, political and socio-economic rights.
IV POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In an article entitled ‘Who is the subject of the rights of man?’, Jacques
Rancière recalls Arendt’s view that the ‘rights of man’must refer either to the
rights of citizens or to the rights of those who have no other property left
beside their humanity. On the former view, the term refers to the rights of
those (citizens) who already have rights while, on the latter view, it signiﬁes
the rights of those who have no rights. Accordingly, the term is either
tautological or devoid of meaning.52 Rancière notes that Arendt’s suspicion
of the rights of man, as a mere abstraction which is powerless to resist the
rightlessness of those standing outside a concrete political community,
derives from the absolute opposition in her thought between a public-
political realm of freedom and a private realm of necessity.53 By reason of her
determination to protect politics from the corrupting inﬂuence of private
needs and her identiﬁcation of political subjectivity with permanent mem-
bership in a national community, Arendt is blind to political struggles that are
waged outside the frames of citizenship and the nation state. Refugees,
52 Jacques Rancière ‘Who is the subject of the rights of man?’ (2004) 103 South
Atlantic Quarterly 297 at 302.
53 See Emilios Christodoulidis ‘De-politicising poverty: Arendt in South Africa’
(2011) 22 Stellenbosch LR 501 for a critique of the opposition of the social and political
in Arendt’s thought. For a more sympathetic reading of Arendt, see Vanya Gastrow
The Demise of Revolutionary Politics and the Rise of Terror? Assessing Hannah Arendt’s
Hypothesis of the ‘Social Question’ in Post-Apartheid South Africa (unpublished MPhil
thesis, University of CapeTown, 2011).
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stateless persons and others, who have forfeited their membership in an
organised human community (read the nation state) are reduced to a life of
bare necessity and ﬁnd themselves in a state of exception, outside the law.54
Rancière argues, against Arendt, that the question of political subjectivity
cannot be settled, in advance, by insisting on an absolute separation between
the public and private spheres. In his view, politics cannot be conﬁned to a
sphere of citizenship that is fenced off from private life. Politics is not
predicated on a pre-existing border which secures equality and freedom for
citizens, while preventing the contamination of the public sphere by eco-
nomic need and privation. Politics is precisely the activity that brings the
border into question. Rancière cites the example of Olympe de Gouges, a
French revolutionary woman, who famously declared that if women could
be sentenced to death as enemies of the revolution, they also had the right to
equal political participation. For him, this illustrates that political predicates
like freedom and equality do not belong to deﬁnite subjects. De Gouges’
statement politicised the boundary that conﬁned women to domestic life — a
sphere of ‘bare life’ which could not be allowed to corrupt the purity of the
public sphere. It demonstrated that ‘[i]f they could lose their ‘‘bare life’’ out
of a public judgment based on political reasons, this meant that even their
bare life — their life doomed to death — was political’.55
The rights of man therefore cannot be restricted to a predeﬁned category
of citizens; nor are they merely abstract ideals, which are unable to challenge
the inequality, exclusion and subordination arising from current distributions
of wealth, power and political membership. Rather, they are open predi-
cates, whose established meaning and scope of application are always subject
to contestation. For Rancière, the gap between the rights that belong to
every human being and the large-scale negation of those rights — ie the gap
between universal human rights and the rights of citizenship — does not
establish the emptiness of the rights of man, but opens up a political space in
which those who effectively have no rights can enact the rights which they,
at one and the same time, have and do not have. Put differently, the gap
between man and citizen provides ‘the opening of an interval for political
subjectivization’,56 in which those who are excluded from membership can
stage scenes of dissensus that challenge established understandings of the
relationship between citizen and subject and between the public-political
and intimate-private spheres.
So, in Rancière’s view, the subject of the rights of man is not a deﬁnite
category of rights bearers, such as citizens, but inheres in the very process of
subjectivisation, which occurs when exclusion and subordination are chal-
lenged in the name of every person’s inscription as a free and equal human
54 Rancière op cit note 52 at 301. Here, he sees a continuity between Arendt’s
position andAgamben’s thesis on ‘the radical suspension of politics in the exception of
bare life’.
55 Ibid at 303.
56 Ibid at 304.
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being. He insists that this does not consist simply in checking whether, in
reality, the rights are achieved or denied, or in bridging the gap between the
universality of human rights and their imperfect realisation, in accordance
with some inescapable inner logic. Freedom and equality, as political predi-
cates, are not determinate, but ‘open up a dispute about what they exactly
entail and whom they concern in which cases’.57 Accordingly, political
processes of subjectivisation do not serve to perfect the identity of the
political community and its members, but disrupt that identity by revealing
that the political subject always is a surplus subject. According to Rancière,
politics precisely is about that part that has no part — the part that
undermines attempts to reduce the political community to the sum of the
parts of the population.
Rancière’s grounding of the right to have rights, in processes of political
contestation through which human rights are enacted, should not be con-
ﬂated with more mainstream understandings that stress the complementarity
of democracy and human rights, and see in democratic struggles for human
rights and the ensuing dialogues between courts, legislatures, the state
administration, civil society and transnational political actors, a steady pro-
gression towards an inclusive, rational society. Rancière argues that politics is
not about reaching a broad societal consensus; nor does it consist in a
conversation about what the members of a society have in common. Rather,
politics exists by virtue of struggles which confront the status quo with that
which has no part, which neither can be heard nor seen in terms of current
conﬁgurations of membership and power:
‘Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or
changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen,
and makes heard a discourse where once there was only a place for noise; it
makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise.’58
Politics consists in the confrontation of two worlds: one in which there is
not and cannot be a relationship between those declaring a dispute and those
who do not recognise them as ‘speaking beings who count’,59 and one in
which the very process of declaring a dispute gives birth to new political
subjects who invoke a common political stage on which the wrong
complained of can be articulated and understood. On this view, politics must
not be equated with the organisation of state powers, the procedures
whereby the consent of the electorate is secured or the legitimation of the
distribution of bodies and places. Instead, politics exists wherever struggles
for equality seek to disrupt the given distribution of power, places and bodies
— what Rancière calls the ‘police’ — by asserting subjectivities and raising
disputes that have no place within current conﬁgurations of power. Politics
takes place where the logic of egalitarianism runs up against the logic of the
police.
57 Ibid at 303.
58 Jacques Rancière Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (1999) 30.
59 Ibid at 27.
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For Rancière, therefore, democracy is neither an ethos nor a way of life;
nor can it be identiﬁed with mechanisms designed to map out and maintain a
broad societal consensus. Democracy is that which undermines the identities
afﬁrmed by conﬁgurations of membership and power, and challenges the
consensus or ethos, which lends the current distribution of places an air of
inevitability. Democracy presupposes a space of appearance, in which new
subjectivities can be asserted to expose the contingency of any given order of
distribution. Still, Rancière is concerned that the contemporary ‘consensus
democracy’, in which the people is transformed into a ‘statistical reduction’,
is closing down this space of appearance.60 The image of a people that can be
cut up into its constituent parts and grasped in its entirety through the
‘science’ of public opinion, does not admit of a space in which those who
have no part can declare a dispute and disrupt the identity of the political
community. In Rancière’s view, the neoliberal emphasis on the rule of law
and the constitutional protection of rights is perfectly consistent with a world
in which politics’ dissensual stage gives way to the harmony of a community
that is deemed to have no surplus and be identical to itself. Rather than
helping to secure a space in which dissent can be staged, constitutional
adjudication tends to depoliticise conﬂict, by transforming it into matters for
expert knowledge and by making the ‘spirit’ of the constitution, which
signiﬁes the identity of the people with itself, the ultimate guide to the
resolution of disputes. Constitutional adjudication thus transforms political
disputes, which involve the confrontation of heterogeneous worlds, into an
elaboration of a broad societal consensus, under the banner of the constitu-
tional spirit or ethos.61
Rancière’s sharp delineation of politics from police could be criticised for
its rather one-sided appraisal of constitutional adjudication that overlooks the
latter’s potential, as a strategic and symbolic resource, in the contestation of
legal and political boundaries. Nonetheless, there is an important upside to
the disassociation of politics from a given set of rules and procedures for the
exercise and legitimation of state power: it allows him to ground the right to
have rights in processes of political subjectivisation which transcend national-
ity or citizenship. Rancière thus manages to keep open a space in which those
whose claims are unintelligible in terms of current conﬁgurations of mem-
bership and power, can nevertheless rely on their rights as free and equal
human beings to stage their dissent and confront the status quo with that
which does not, yet somehow ought to have a part in the order of
distribution.62
60 Ibid at 105.
61 Ibid at 109–10.
62 See Kesby op cit note 1 at 118–41 and Andrew Schaap ‘Enacting the right to
have rights: Jacques Rancière’s critique of HannahArendt’ (2011) 10 European Journal
of Political Theory 22 for further elaborations of the signiﬁcance of Rancière’s
conception of politics and the right to have rights.
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V ADJUDICATING THE RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS
Human dignity has been central to judicial efforts to mediate the tension
between South Africa’s national sovereignty and its constitutional and inter-
national obligations to respect and protect the rights of everyone inside its
territory, including non-citizens. While recognising the power of the state to
differentiate between citizens and non-citizens and to decide whom to admit
to its territory and on what terms,63 the courts have, nevertheless, relied on
human dignity to carve out a space in which those at the margins of the legal
order are protected from degradation. Dignity has thus been central to efforts
to negotiate the divide between the right of a self-governing citizenry to
determine civic and political boundaries, and the right to challenge those
boundaries in the name of a common humanity which inheres in every
person, irrespective of nationality or citizenship.
The courts’ reliance on human dignity in this area raises several questions.
Can dignity mark out a space in which non-citizens are treated with equal
concern and respect? How is it to do so, in a world characterised by the
disjunction between mass migration, globalisation and increasing interde-
pendence, on the one hand, and the powerful hold of myths of national
sovereignty on the legal and political imagination, on the other?64 How can
reliance on dignity aid migrants, whose universal and inalienable rights are
declared boldly in the Constitution and international treaties, yet whose
political powerlessness renders them vulnerable to prolonged detention,
deportation, xenophobic attacks and administrative ﬁat?
In this part, I examine a few key judgments dealing with the rights of
non-citizens. Relying in part on the theoretical perspectives considered in
parts II to IV above, I ask whether a dignity-based constitutional jurispru-
dence can point a way out of Arendt’s conundrum. Is it not bound simply to
reproduce the divide between the rights of man and the rights of the citizen,
and thereby to conﬁrm the powerlessness of those who, deprived of mem-
bership in a concrete political community, have only their bare humanity to
63 In Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA) para 29, the
Supreme Court of Appeal quoted from a judgment of the United States Supreme
Court in which it was stated: ‘It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential in self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see ﬁt to prescribe.’ The
same dictum was referred to approvingly by the Constitutional Court in Chairperson
of the National Assembly, Ex Parte: In re Certification of the Amended Text of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) para 21n31
within the context of a challenge to s 22 of the amended constitutional text, which
restricts the right to freedom of trade, occupation or profession to citizens. See also
Union for Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007
(4) SA395 (CC) para 46.
64 See Peter Vale ‘Sovereignty, identity and the prospects for Southern Africa’s
people’ in David Chidester, Phillip Dexter & Wilmot James What Holds Us Together:
Social Cohesion in South Africa (2003) 23 on the continued hold of ideas of national and
territorial sovereignty on the post-apartheid political imagination.
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fall back on? Alternatively, can it serve to politicise this distinction, or help
open up spaces of democratic engagement, through which a polity can
become more responsive to challenges to its civic and political boundaries?
(a) Dignity has no nationality
In a number of judgments, the courts have invoked the constitutional right
and value of human dignity to protect non-citizens against laws and practices
which perpetuate and deepen their degradation, disempowerment and
exclusion. In Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs,65 the
Constitutional Court expressly rejected the state’s contention that foreign
nationals who were present in the national territory, but who had not been
granted permission to enter, were not ‘in our country’ for purposes of s 7(1)
of the Constitution and were, accordingly, not entitled to the right to
freedom and security of the person and the rights of detained persons. To
deny them these rights, would negate the constitutional values of human
dignity, equality and freedom66 and demean the ‘very fabric of our society
and the values embodied in our Constitution’.67 The court held that s 34(8)
of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 was unconstitutional, to the extent that it
did not place any restrictions on the length of time that illegal foreigners
could be detained on a ship, at a port of entry. To remedy this defect, it read
words into the section to afford detainees on a ship, like those detained at a
state facility, the right not to be detained for longer than 30 days, provided
that a court order could be obtained to extend their detention for a period
not exceeding 90 days. At the same time, the court found that other
restrictions on the rights of detainees on a ship, such as their exclusion from
the s 34(2) right to be released after 48 hours, constituted a justiﬁable
limitation.68
In Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka,69 the Supreme Court of Appeal
invalidated a general prohibition on asylum seekers to work or study.
Although the respondents could not rely directly on s 22 of the Constitution,
which reserves the right to freedom of occupation to South African citizens,
the court, nevertheless, held that their right to human dignity was violated in
cases where they had no other sources of income or support. In the view of
the court, human dignity ‘has no nationality. It is inherent in all people —
citizens and non-citizens alike — simply because they are human’.70 While
dignity does not vest an absolute right to individual self-fulﬁlment in asylum
seekers, it presupposes the ability to live ‘without positive humiliation and
degradation’.71 The court reasoned that a general prohibition had the effect
65 2004 (4) SA125 (CC).
66 Ibid para 26.
67 Ibid para 20.
68 Ibid para 46.
69 Supra note 63.
70 Ibid para 25.
71 Ibid para 32.
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of degrading those who are destitute by forcing them to beg or steal. Despite
the ringing endorsement of the dignity of everyone, including those at the
lower rungs of the immigration ladder, who cannot claim to have made
South Africa their home and whose immigration status is yet to be deter-
mined, the relief granted was quite narrow. The judgment does not confer on
asylum seekers a general right to work and study, but leaves it to the Standing
Committee for RefugeeAffairs to determine whether applicants qualify on a
case by case basis or to issue appropriate guidelines to the relevant ofﬁcials.
In Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs,72 the Constitutional Court rejected
the contention that the state, when declaring a person an illegal foreigner, is
not obliged to furnish reasons for its decision. Given the harsh effects of such
a declaration and in view of the batho pele principle, read with the
constitutional values of dignity and ubuntu, the court found that it would be
‘excessively over formalistic and contrary to the spirit of the Constitution’ to
hold that the applicants were not entitled to reasons.73
These judgments afﬁrm the right of non-citizens not to be reduced to
mere objects of state power (Lawyers for Human Rights), to be free from
humiliation and degradation (Watchenuka), and to the justiﬁcation of exer-
cises of public power (Koyabe). Importantly, they sever human dignity from
nationality and avoid collapsing humanity onto the political community of
equals instituted by the Constitution. At the same time, however, these
judgments carefully traverse the tension between universal human rights and
state sovereignty, where the rights they rely on are narrowly circumscribed
by the state’s power to detain and deport illegal foreigners. Important as these
judicial pronouncements are, one could well ask whether they can allay
Arendt’s concern over the impotence of the ‘rights of man’ in coming to
terms with the powerlessness of those who, by virtue of their exclusion from
membership in a political community, are deprived of a place in the world
from which they can overcome their subordination.
(b) Towards a more encompassing citizenship
A second group of cases views the relationship between dignity and citizen-
ship from a different perspective. While these cases sound many of the same
themes as the cases referred to above (most notably, the vulnerability of
non-citizens and the need to protect them from humiliation and degrada-
tion), they also introduce a second element by drawing on certain similarities
between the position of the applicants and that of citizens. In these cases,
dignity does not deﬁne the minimum conditions of personhood that must be
guaranteed to all individuals, irrespective of nationality or immigration status.
Instead, it is used to question distinctions between citizens and certain
categories of non-citizens, and thus to extend some of the rights and beneﬁts
formerly restricted to citizens to categories like permanent residents.
72 2010 (4) SA327 (CC).
73 Ibid para 62.
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The Constitutional Court judgment in Khosa v Minister of Social Develop-
ment; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development74 nicely illustrates the possibili-
ties and pitfalls of this approach. In this case, the court held that the exclusion
of permanent residents from beneﬁts under the Social Assistance Act 59 of
1992 violated the constitutional rights of non-discrimination and access to
social security. Reading these rights through the lens of human dignity,
Mokgoro J emphasised the devastating impact of the differentiation in
question. Permanent residents in need of social security programmes were
stigmatised as inferior, reduced to the role of supplicants and relegated to the
margins of society.75 Although this may appear, at ﬁrst glance, like another
instance of the disarticulation of dignity from citizenship, closer scrutiny
reveals that in fact, it is the opposite. Here, dignity is re-articulated with an
extended notion of citizenship. The judgment emphasises the similarities
between permanent residents and citizens. Like citizens, permanent residents
have made SouthAfrica their home, owe a duty of allegiance to the state and
pay taxes.76 In a celebrated passage, their well-being is tied to the well-being
of society as a whole:
‘Sharing responsibility for the problems and consequences of poverty equally as
a community represents the extent to which wealthier members of the
community view the minimal well-being of the poor as connected with their
personal well-being and the well-being of the community as a whole.’77
Thus, on the basis of equal recognition, permanent residents are cast as
members of a community, who are tied to the citizenry through bonds of
solidarity and trust, and are entitled to full moral and social citizenship. Their
position is distinguished expressly from that of temporary residents and illegal
aliens, whose position remains unaffected by the court’s order.78 The appli-
cants’ entitlement to social security beneﬁts therefore does not arise simply
from their humanity or material need, but is conditioned on their immigra-
tion status. This is odd, given the heavy reliance placed by the majority on the
text of s 27(1) of the Constitution, which confers the right to social security
on ‘everyone’.79 Why then, are temporary residents categorically excluded?
Would it not make more sense, in view of s 27’s universal language, to
include temporary residents in the category of those entitled to the right, but
if needs be, to justify their exclusion from speciﬁc programmes with refer-
74 2004 (6) SA505 (CC) para 76.
75 Ibid paras 74, 76, 77, 80 and 81.
76 Ibid paras 58, 59 and 74.
77 Ibid para 74. See also Lawyers for Human Rights supra note 65 at para 20: ‘The
very fabric of our society and the values embodied in our Constitution could be
demeaned if the freedom and dignity of illegal foreigners are violated in the process of
preserving our national integrity.’
78 Ibid paras 59, 89 and 98.
79 Ibid paras 42, 46, 47, 54, 79 and 85. In response to the argument that most
developed countries set citizenship as a requirement for access to social security,
Mokgoro J argues that ‘those countries do not have constitutions that entitle
‘‘everyone’’ to have access to social security’ (para 54).
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ence to the availability of resources80 or in terms of the general limitation
clause in s 36(1) of the Constitution? Why does ‘everyone’, in this context,
refer only to citizens and those in a similar position to citizens?
In the end, it seems the majority judgment hinges less on the lack of a
textual qualiﬁcation of the beneﬁciaries of s 27(1) than on a particular vision
of citizens’ dignity and the community of equals created by the Constitution.
On this reading, the Constitution embraces a more encompassing vision, in
which moral and social citizenship extends to everyone who has been
admitted to, and has assumed the obligations and responsibilities attached to
permanent residence in South Africa. This is an attractive vision, particularly
when compared to the more restrictive understanding of citizenship inform-
ing Ngcobo J’s dissenting judgment.81 Nevertheless, the way the majority
conﬁnes its reasoning to permanent residents is problematic. As Lucy Will-
iams points out, the majority judgment simply assumes, without citing any
evidence in support of the claim, that temporary residents do not have
meaningful ties of allegiance and commitment to their country of resi-
dence.82 She argues that this runs counter to the court’s previous judgment in
Larbi-Odam v Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West
Province),83 in which it embraced a more ‘nuanced understanding of the
80 Section 27(2): ‘The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these
rights.’
81 Ngcobo J accepted that ‘everyone’, in the context of s 27(1), indeed means
‘everyone’ (para 111). Testing the restriction of the category of beneﬁciaries against
the general limitation clause in s 36(1), he argued that the limitation of the right was
neither permanent nor absolute (paras 115–19); that, given limited resources, the state
was entitled to give preference to its own citizens; and that the limitation served the
important objective of encouraging self-sufﬁciency among immigrants and discour-
aging immigration motivated by the wish to access welfare beneﬁts (paras 120–1 and
132). In view of these considerations, he held that it was reasonable to restrict social
grants to South African citizens, but that the restriction of child grants and care-
dependency grants to those whose primary care giver or parent is a South African
citizen was unconstitutional. Although his judgment subjects the exclusion of all
categories of non-citizens from social assistance to a proportionality inquiry, the
sharpness of his distinction between citizens and non-citizens and his acceptance of
the legitimacy of state policies which put citizens ﬁrst, ultimately leaves less room
than the majority judgment for the contestation of the boundaries between the
polity’s inside and outside.
82 Lucy Williams ‘Issues and challenges in addressing poverty and legal rights: A
comparativeUnited States/ SouthAfrican analysis’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 436 at 468–9.
83 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC). In this case, the Constitutional Court held that a
regulation providing that only South African citizens could be appointed as teachers
in a permanent capacity amounted to unfair discrimination. The constitutional value
of human dignity was central to the court’s reasoning. Mokgoro J reasoned that
differentiation on the ground of citizenship has the potential to impair the human
dignity of non-citizens in view of their minority status, lack of political power and
general vulnerability. She also pointed out that citizenship is a relatively immutable
characteristic and referred to SouthAfrica’s history of the exploitation and instrumen-
talisation of non-citizens and invocation of citizenship as a pretext for racial discrimi-
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similarities between temporary and permanent legal residents regarding their
societal involvement, connection and contribution’84 and included tempo-
rary residents within the ambit of the relief granted.85
(c) The dignity of (non-)citizenship
Judicial reliance on human dignity in cases concerning the rights of non-
citizens appears, then, to alternate between two registers. At times, the courts
invoke an inviolable core of human dignity inhering in all human beings,
regardless of their citizenship or immigration status. At other times, dignity is
articulated with an extended notion of citizenship. This second use of dignity
corresponds to the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence in areas such as
equality and voting rights. For instance, in August v Electoral Commission,
Sachs J famously pronounced that ‘[t]he vote of each and every citizen is a
badge of dignity and of personhood. Quite literally, it says that everybody
counts.’86 Here, dignity is not used to refer to the abstract moral capacity
inherent in every human being, but denotes the equality and self-govern-
ment of members of a concrete human community who are embedded in
particular social structures.87 The reference to dignity is no longer a reference
to a generalised, undifferentiated humanity, but to concrete human beings.
nation. In view of these considerations, she concluded that citizenship is analogous to
the grounds of discrimination listed in s 8(2) of the Interim Constitution (paras
19–20). She further held that the discrimination in question was unfair in relation to
permanent residents, who had been allowed to make South Africa their home and
were entitled to equal employment opportunities. Discrimination against them in the
employment sphere deprived them of job security and as a result, impeded them in
making personal life choices relating to their family, social and professional life (paras
23–5).
84 Williams op cit note 82 at 469.
85 Although the Constitutional Court in Larbi-Odam supra note 83 focused on the
position of permanent residents in its analysis of whether the regulation constituted
unfair discrimination, it decided against making an order of partial invalidity which
excluded temporary residents from its ambit. Mokgoro J noted that many temporary
residents had been appointed to teaching positions for an indeﬁnite period (paras
41–3) and thus suggested that, similar to permanent residents, some temporary
residents have forged strong connections with, and make important contributions to
their country of residence.
86 August v Electoral Commission 1999 (3) SA1 (CC) para 17.
87 See François du Bois ‘Freedom and the dignity of citizens’ in A J Barnard-
Naudé, Drucilla Cornell & François du Bois (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-
Apartheid Legal Order: The Critical Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann (2009) 112 at 142–7
on the distinction between the abstract dignity of humanity and the dignity of
citizens. Writing in a slightly different context, du Bois notes that whereas Kant’s
moral writings conceive of individuals in abstract, impersonal terms and demand
respect only for their moral capacity, his legal writings are concerned with the respect
due to concrete, socially embedded persons. He argues that unlike the former, which
does not support a strong version of moral self-determination, the latter is better
equipped to ground a right of general freedom as construed byAckermann J in Ferreira
v Levin NO 1996 (2) SA621 (CC).
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As a result, dignity becomes imbued with the distinctions that are constitu-
tive of a concrete political community.88
The majority judgment in Khosa suggests that the notion of citizen’s
dignity can play an important role in the contestation of the boundaries
deﬁning membership in the legal and political community. Given the
imperfect ﬁt between nationality and residence, the formal legal category
of nationality or citizenship is but an imprecise approximation of the web
of relationships, rights and responsibilities that are evoked by the idea of
citizen’s dignity. For this reason, citizen’s dignity can be used to challenge the
restriction of certain rights to a closed category of citizens (read ‘nationals’).
To paraphrase Benhabib, the disjunction between practices of democratic
closure and the constitutional commitment to the equal dignity of everyone
within the national territory can open up spaces for acts of democratic
iteration, through which a political community reﬂects critically on its own
practices of exclusion.
However, this is only one part of the story. The exclusion of temporary
residents from the relief granted in Khosa suggests that, while a dignity-based
jurisprudence can serve to politicise the distinction between the rights of man
and the rights of the citizen, the resulting jurisprudence can also ﬁnd ways of
depoliticising that distinction. In Khosa, the open-endedness of the court’s
expanded understanding of citizen’s dignity quickly gave way to a fairly rigid
distinction based on the legal status of permanent residence.89 Moreover, the
majority downplayed the cost implications of its judgment for the state by
suggesting that the state could adopt immigration policies that would ensure
that only those ‘who will proﬁt, and not be a burden to, the State’ are
admitted to the status of permanent residence.90 The expansion in Khosa of
the community of equals thus went hand-in-hand with a re-drawing of the
boundary between the community’s inside and outside — in a way that resists
the universality of the Constitution’s own language — and a re-assertion of
88 This understanding of dignity as attaching to embodied human beings and
embedded in social relations is also evident from the Constitutional Court’s under-
standing of equality, moral citizenship and the harm resulting from misrecognition.
Consider, for example, Sachs J’s statement in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian
and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) paras 15 and
60. See also Sachs J’s concurring judgment in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) paras 107, 127 and 134 that an active
rather than purely formal sense of citizenship presupposes the acceptance of people
for who they are, and his ﬁnding that the moral citizenship of gays and lesbians was
denied by laws which signalled that same-sex relationships were not worthy of equal
legal recognition and protection. In the view of the court, the harm inﬂicted on gays
and lesbians cannot be severed from the law’s impact on their capacity to participate as
equals in social and political life.
89 See Jonathan Klaaren ‘Constitutional citizenship in South Africa’ (2010) 94
International Journal of Constitutional Law 94 at 108 who argues that the key to the
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on citizenship lies in ‘the concept of lawful
residence, rather than nationality per se’.
90 Khosa supra note 74 para 65.
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the state’s sovereign power to deﬁne the class of persons entitled to perma-
nent residence.91
The subsequent judgment in Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private
Security Industry Regulatory Authority92 conﬁrms that, despite the ﬂuidity of the
distinctions between different categories of non-citizens, there are limits to
the inclusivity of the court’s vision of moral and social citizenship. In this
case, the majority of the Constitutional Court held that legislation which
restricted employment in the private security industry to citizens and perma-
nent residents, did not violate the right of refugees to equality and non-
discrimination. The minority framed their inquiry in terms of South Africa’s
international-law obligations to refugees, stressed the similarity between the
situation of refugees and permanent residents93 and focused on the social
stigma and material disadvantage engendered by refugees’ exclusion.94 On
the other hand, the majority held on to a more clear-cut distinction between
permanent residents and refugees and paid considerable deference to the
state’s power to make distinctions on the basis of citizenship or immigration
status, particularly on issues that have a bearing on security and the distribu-
tion of material resources.95
The Constitutional Court’s order in Mamba v Minister of Social Develop-
ment96 reveals similar tensions, particularly when viewed in light of the
Gauteng Provincial Government’s response to the judgment. Faced with the
imminent closure of the camps that had been set up by the government to
accommodate victims of the xenophobic attacks of 2008, the court directed
the parties ‘to engage with each other meaningfully and with all other
stakeholders . . . in order to resolve the differences and difﬁculties aired in
this application in the light of the values of the Constitution, the constitu-
tional and statutory obligations of the respondents and the rights and duties of
the residents of the shelters’.97 The extension of the requirement of meaning-
ful engagement to disputes involving the rights of non-citizens appeared
signiﬁcant, especially in view of the fact that orders of meaningful engage-
ment often are said to emphasise the agency and voice of those consulted and
91 Sandra Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative
Constitution (2010) 161 writes, in view of this ambivalence: ‘It remains to be seen
whether the Khosa decision represents the ﬁrst step in a gradual process of extending
socio-economic rights to those marginalised by an intersection of poverty and
nationality, or the outer limits of the Court’s willingness to expand access to socio-
economic rights to non-nationals.’
92 Supra note 63.
93 Ibid paras 99, 104–10.
94 Ibid para 118.
95 Ibid paras 36–42.
96 (CC) unreported judgment in case no 65/08 of 21August 2008.
97 Ibid para 1. See also Minister of Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town [2013]
ZASCA 134, which concerned the decision to close the Cape Town Refugee
Centre. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the failure of the Department of
Home Affairs to consult stakeholders was arbitrary and thus inconsistent with the
constitutional principle of legality.
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to treat them as equal participants in a constitutional dialogue.98 Here, the
basic dignity of the men, women and children who were violently expelled
from the communities they lived in — ie the right to be treated with respect
for one’s intrinsic moral worth, regardless of citizenship or immigration status
— ﬂows over into the right to be active participants in a conversation about
the terms of their reintegration into the community.
However, the Gauteng Provincial Government adopted a narrow reading
of the court’s order. Despite the granting of a second interim order,99 the
government started closing the camps without engaging meaningfully with
those affected/stakeholders on the reintegration process. Clearly, the govern-
ment found it difﬁcult to conceive of the victims of xenophobia as fellow
participants in a structured dialogue, aimed at creating an appropriate
remedial regime. Arguably, it failed even to see that any of the victims’ rights
were being infringed or threatened.100 Their extreme vulnerability and
political powerlessness, coupled with the state of exception they found
themselves in as the beneﬁciaries of temporary relief under the Disaster
Management Act 57 of 2002, were not conducive to their being viewed as
bearers of civic dignity or political agency. In addition, the manner in which
the matter came before the Constitutional Court,101 the way in which the
order was furnished, the failure of the court to give content to the relevant
constitutional provisions and to spell out the implications thereof for the
98 See eg Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para
41: ‘[T]hose seeking evictions should be encouraged not to rely on concepts of
faceless and anonymous squatters automatically to be expelled as obnoxious social
nuisances. Such a stereotypical approach has no place in the society envisaged by the
Constitution; justice and equity require that everyone is to be treated as an individual
bearer of rights entitled to respect for his or her dignity.’
See also Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v City of Johannesburg 2008 (3)
SA208 (CC) para 20: ‘People in need of housing are not, and must not be regarded as
a disempowered mass. They must be encouraged to be pro-active and not purely
defensive.’
See further Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010
(3) SA 454 (CC) per Sachs J para 408: ‘[Meaningful engagement] expands the
concept of citizenship beyond traditional notions of electoral rights and claims for
diplomatic protection, to include the full substantive beneﬁts and entitlements
envisaged by the Constitution for all the people who live in the country and to whom
it belongs. At the same time it focuses on the reciprocal duty of citizens to be active,
participatory and responsible and to make their own individual and collective
contributions towards the realisation of the beneﬁts and entitlements they claim for
themselves, not to speak of the well-being of the community as a whole.’
99 (CC) unreported judgment in case no 65/08 of 16 September 2008.
100 This was the position of the court a quo. The High Court held in Mamba v
Minister of Social Development [2008] ZAGPHC 255 that the applicants had not
demonstrated that any of their rights had been infringed by the impending closure of
the camps.
101 Brian Ray ‘Engagement’s possibilities and limits as a socio-economic rights
remedy’ (2010) 9 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 399 at 407–8.
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dispute at hand,102 together with its acceptance of the need for the closure of
the camps by a certain date,103 all contributed to what Brian Ray describes as
a lack of incentive, for the government to take the process seriously.104
Indeed, the failure of the court-ordered engagement in Mamba highlights the
structural barriers impeding access to justice for non-citizens, as well as the
ways in which the political community tends to resist the inclusion of
non-citizens in decision-making processes.
The idea of citizen’s dignity thus vacillates, somewhat uneasily, between
different understandings of the community of equals inaugurated by the
Constitution. On the one hand, it presupposes the right of a self-governing
political community to engage in practices of democratic closure while, on
the other hand, it points towards a more encompassing vision, in which the
rights of equal recognition and public participation extend to everyone living
under the law’s jurisdiction. Citizen’s dignity remains linked to legal deﬁni-
tions of citizenship and/or residence, and yet can be used to question the
restrictiveness of established legal categories. Sometimes, it is used to politi-
cise the boundaries of the legal community and, at other times, to make them
appear natural and inevitable.
VI CONCLUDING REMARKS
Debates over the rights of non-citizens are traditionally framed in terms of a
series of dichotomies, such as those between human rights and popular
sovereignty, the rights of man and the rights of the citizen, and the dignity
inherent in all of humanity and the dignity arising from membership in a
particular community. However, the theoretical literature and the case law
reviewed above suggest that these distinctions are unstable and that their
deconstruction may be a condition of the very possibility of the right to have
rights.
On the one hand, it is problematic to reduce democracy to the sovereign
right of a political community to establish and maintain its own boundaries.
As Etienne Balibar notes, ‘the traditional institution of borders’, which in the
modern era has fulﬁlled the role of ‘a ‘‘sovereign’’ or nondemocratic
condition of democracy itself’, today simultaneously serves, in a variety of
contexts, as ‘an instrument of security control, social segregation, and
unequal access to the means of existence, and sometimes as an institutional
distribution of life and death’.105 To insulate civic and territorial boundaries
from processes of democratic renegotiation, or to insist that only nationals
participate in those processes, is to legitimate the above forms of institutional
102 Liebenberg op cit note 91 at 422 notes that meaningful engagement ‘had to
occur in a normative vacuum’ as the court, while referring to the need to resolve the
issues in light of the Constitution, failed to provide ‘substantive guidance’ on the
meaning of the relevant constitutional norms within the context of the dispute.
103 Ibid at 422.
104 Ray op cit note 101 at 408.
105 Balibar op cit note 32 at 117.
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violence and to stiﬂe new democratic imaginations, in the name of a narrow
identiﬁcation of democracy with the institutions of the nation-state. While it
is true that democracy presupposes a bounded political community, it is also
the case that its continued vitality today depends on the availability of spaces
for the contestation of legal and political boundaries, as well as procedures
and institutions through which the gap between citizenship and the circle of
those affected by decision making can be mediated.
On the other hand, just as the continued vitality of democracy and
democratic citizenship depends on acts of renewed foundation, so too the
capacity of human rights to challenge inequality and exclusion arising from
civic and territorial boundaries derives from the dynamic interplay between
the rights of man and the rights of the citizen. Those who, in Arendt’s view,
lack a place in the world from which their speech and action can register with
the legal and political community nevertheless can enact scenes of dissensus
by calling the boundary between man and citizen into question. We have
seen that, for Rancière, it is the instability of this boundary that is constitutive
of the political. In his view, politics exists where those who have no right to
speak declare a dispute by requiring two worlds to confront each other: the
world in which they do share a common stage with those who deny that they
are capable of speaking and acting in public and the world in which they do
not. By positing themselves as speaking beings and by raising matters that are
not considered proper topics of political discourse, they are politicising the
very distinction between a public realm of speech and action, and the bare
humanity of those who are excluded from membership in an organised
political community. To invoke Lindahl’s work on boundaries, it is through
a-legal boundary crossings that activists and non-citizens reveal the contin-
gent nature of the boundaries that separate the polity’s inside from its outside
and serve as the basis of the distinction between the rights of man and the
rights of the citizen. These boundary crossings draw attention to forms of
domination and exclusion that typically fall through the cracks between the
rights of man and the rights of the citizen, and challenge them in the name of
alternative distributions of ought-places which the legal order, in terms of
its self-inscription into a larger distribution of membership and place, ought
to, but does not, accommodate.
An analysis of our case law conﬁrms that the dividing line between the
rights of man and the rights of the citizen is permeable. Judgments like
Larbi-Odam106 and Khosa107 demonstrate that citizenship is a contested
category, that the rights of citizenship have been extended, in varying
degrees, to different categories of non-nationals, and that the rights of foreign
nationals cannot and should not be conﬁned to the abstract, generalised rights
of man. Even claims ostensibly founded in rights that transcend differences in
citizenship and immigration status — like the right not to be subject to
degradation or humiliation — sometimes expose the instability of the
106 Supra note 83.
107 Supra note 74.
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distinction between the dignity of man and the dignity of the citizen. For
instance, the judgment in Watchenuka108 situates the right to work at the
interface of the distinction between abstract moral dignity and social citizen-
ship, and thus creates room for claims, based on the rights against degradation
and humiliation, to blend into claims questioning current distributions of the
rights of citizenship.
However, we must resist the illusion that a dignity-based constitutional
jurisprudence initiates the unfolding of a universal hospitality, in which
obstacles to the full recognition of the humanity of non-citizens progressively
will be overcome. Even a cursory overview of the case law suggests that
ofﬁcial decisions vindicating the rights of non-nationals and/or resting on a
more universal understanding of citizenship, exist side-by-side with decisions
that tend to naturalise existing boundaries. The extension of the rights of
citizenship to permanent residents or to nationals of certain countries could
help trigger further victories for the rights of non-citizens, but they could also
go hand-in-hand with new forms of exclusion, as demonstrated by events in
Europe and elsewhere. This should not come as a surprise: the instability of
the distinction between man and citizen, which enables challenges to
domination and exclusion, may also serve to legitimate civic and territorial
boundaries and even, to facilitate contractions in the body politic.
Against this background, it is important not only to theorise the possibili-
ties of a dignity-based constitutional jurisprudence, but also to consider its
limits. Rancière’s distinction between politics and police provides one
possible angle from which to start doing so. For him, politics disrupts the
status quo by raising subjectivities that have no right to exist and by invoking
claims that have no business being heard. Some such challenges succeed in
reconﬁguring current distributions of membership and power, by confront-
ing them with the logic of egalitarianism. But once that happens, they are
re-inscribed into the logic of the police and become part and parcel of a new
conﬁguration of membership, roles and powers that continues to exclude
certain viewpoints, subjectivities and institutionalisations. Politics, therefore,
does not consist in the inexorable march of the logic of universality and
inclusion, but depends on the capacity of new disputes and subjectivities to
keep pushing against the limits of current institutionalisations of membership
and power. Nevertheless, these limits are resilient, not only to the extent that
they make it difﬁcult for new voices to be heard and for new disputes to
register with the polity, but also in so far as they tend to blunt the radical edge
of new subjectivities, by including them into the count of the polity, and
thus, by inscribing them into the order of the given.
Lindahl’s analysis of legal boundaries offers a different vantage point from
which to consider the limits of a dignity-based constitutional jurisprudence.
He notes that civic and territorial boundaries not only include the legal order
within a larger distribution of ought-places, but in doing so, also exclude
108 Supra note 63.
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certain possibilities as foreign or strange. This outside is ineradicable and can
never be overcome simply by invoking the universality of human dignity. To
the extent that dignity has been positivised into a particular legal order, it is
always already qualiﬁed by civic and territorial boundaries. While boundary
crossings could interrupt the unity of legal spaces by drawing attention to the
gap between current distributions of membership and place, and the legal
order’s commitment to a distribution of ought-spaces that respects the
inherent dignity of every human person, not all the alternative distributions
of ought-places evoked by these challenges will be capable of being recogn-
ised as the legal order’s own.
The judgments in Khosa109 and Union for Refugee Women110 illustrate the
ways in which distinctions in immigration status reinsert themselves into the
notion of an expanded citizen’s dignity, while the Mamba111 case demon-
strates the fragility of initiatives to include non-citizens in processes of
democratic engagement. These cases not only serve as a reminder of the
ineradicability of the tension between the legal order’s inside and outside, but
also of the dangers inherent in dignity-based mediations of the rights of man
and the rights of the citizen. One such danger is that of collapsing the
distinction between the universality of a human dignity that transcends legal
and political boundaries, and those positive-legal guarantees of dignity that
are always already qualiﬁed by the boundaries of a particular legal and
political order. Another consists in the domestication of political subjectivity,
by injecting the ﬁgure of the ‘good citizen’ or the ‘good foreigner’ into it. In
this sanitised version, difference becomes an extension of sameness and the
other loses her capacity to disrupt the order of the given. Rights of political
participation are conditioned on conformity to idealised notions of belong-
ing, thereby depriving politics of its agonistic dimension.112
If dignity is to play a critical role in the negotiation and renegotiation of
legal boundaries, it needs to be severed from discourses which make these
boundaries appear natural and straightforward, or which premise democratic
agency on notions of digniﬁed behaviour or conformity to the ﬁgure of the
109 Supra note 74.
110 Supra note 63.
111 Supra note 96.
112 See Bonnie Honig Democracy and the Foreigner (2001), who criticises romantic
understandings of the capacity of foreigners to reinvigorate citizenship, and proposes
instead a gothic reading which captures the ambivalence characterising the relation-
ship amongst democratic subjects and between subjects and their attachments. See
also Henk Botha ‘Equality, dignity, and the politics of interpretation’ in Wessel le
Roux & Karin van Marle (eds) Post-Apartheid Fragments: Law, Politics and Critique
(2007) 148 at 166–9, arguing that some Constitutional Court judgments depoliticise
struggles for equality through their emphasis on moral choice and reputation and
their conﬂation of dignity with digniﬁed behaviour; and Marius Pieterse ‘Procedural
relief, constitutional citizenship and socio-economic rights as legitimate expectations’
(2012) 28 SAJHR 359 at 374–8, where he criticises judgments which condition
socio-economic rights on conformity to a neo-liberal concept of citizens as paying
customers.
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good citizen. A dignity-based constitutional jurisprudence needs to maintain
a critical distance from exclusivist concepts of citizenship113 and from
discourses which equate citizenship with nationality.114 It must accept that
foreign nationals stand at the centre of a legal and political discourse through
which they, together with and in opposition to legislatures, public servants,
courts, citizens and non-governmental organisations, ‘are generating and
re-generating our contemporary script of South African citizenship’.115 As far
as possible, it must be alive to the ways in which they, through their
boundary crossings, disrupt the distinction between the political communi-
ty’s inside and outside, and invoke alternative understandings of the distinc-
tion between the dignity of man and the dignity of the citizen.
113 For different explanations of the exclusivity of popular understandings of South
African citizenship, see Jean Comaroff & John L Comaroff ‘Naturing the nation:
Aliens, apocalypse, and the postcolonial state’ in Hansen & Stepputat op cit note 6 at
120, arguing that an emphasis on ‘autochthony’, which treats belonging and inclusion
as technical issues that can be answered with reference to nature, serves to depoliticise
the boundaries of the South African nation-state and to legitimate a new politics of
exclusion; and Jonathan Klaaren ‘Citizenship, xenophobic violence, and law’s dark
side’ in Loren B Landau (ed) Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence and
Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa (2011) 135 at 142–5 arguing, with reference to
the work of Landau, that South African citizenship is shaped through the opposition
between an exclusivist understanding of citizenship and the demands of migrants for
the rights attaching to lawful residence.
114 See Wessel le Roux ‘Migration, street democracy and expatriate voting rights’
(2009) 24 SA Public Law 370 for a critique of the reading advanced by the expatriate
voting rights lobby of the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Richter v Minister of
Home Affairs 2009 (3) SA615 (CC). In Le Roux’s view, the said reading of the Richter
judgment conﬂates nationality with citizenship, privileges national patriotism over
constitutional patriotism and ignores the relationship between residence and demo-
cratic accountability. This interpretation stands in the way of struggles for the
extension of voting rights to non-nationals who are permanently resident in South
Africa because it ties political rights to culturalist notions of nationhood and
belonging.
115 Klaaren op cit note 113 at 144.
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